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Summary
Under the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210), Congress approved expedited
legislative procedures (no amendment, limited debate) for trade agreements that are
entered into before July 1, 2005.  That deadline will be extended by two years
automatically if:  (1) the President requests an extension not later than April 1, 2005;
and (2) neither House of the Congress adopts an extension disapproval resolution before
July 1, 2005.  The President submitted the request for an extension on March 30, 2005.
An extension disapproval resolution (S.Res. 100) was introduced in the Senate on April
6, 2005.  A resolution must be reported out of committee to be considered on the floor.
An extension will not affect legislative procedures relating to trade agreements already
signed, but could be important for on-going trade negotiations, especially trade
negotiations that involve a large number of countries or are economically or politically
controversial.  This product will be updated periodically.
Under Title XXI (Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002) of the Trade
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210), Congress approved expedited procedures for legislation to
implement trade agreements, as long as the trade agreements were reached before a
deadline of July 1, 2005.  This congressional consent to consider trade agreement
legislation under expedited procedures is known as “trade promotion authority.”  The
Trade Act of 2002 also provided for an automatic two-year extension of the deadline in
trade promotion authority, and the 109th Congress might decide whether or not to stop that
extension from going into effect.
Trade Promotion Authority in Brief
Trade promotion authority (TPA; formerly called fast-track authority) is an
arrangement involving the executive and legislative branches that recognizes the distinct
constitutional responsibilities of those branches regarding trade negotiations and trade
policy.  By virtue of the constitutional power to conduct foreign affairs, the President has
authority to negotiate and enter into agreements with foreign countries, including those
agreements dealing with trade and tariff policy.  At the same time, the Constitution gives
Congress the primary power over trade policy under Article I, and the Congress decides
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whether or not to approve statutory changes that are called for under trade agreements that
the President has negotiated. 
The basic provisions of TPA were established in the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618)
for a limited period of time.  Those provisions were renewed periodically, most recently
under the Trade Act of 2002.  Under TPA, Congress provides that, if a trade agreement
is reached by a given deadline, it will consider legislation to implement the trade
agreement under expedited procedures that prohibit amendments, limit debate, and set
deadlines on congressional action.  As a condition for these procedural restraints,
Congress requires the President to consult with appropriate congressional bodies before
and during the negotiations, notify Congress before beginning any negotiations and before
entering into a trade agreement, provide reports as specified, and meet other conditions
as provided.1  Congress also places restrictions on the purpose of a trade agreement and
on language in an implementing bill.  Through these provisions, Congress sets trade
negotiating objectives and is informed of progress in the negotiations, and the President
is assured that a trade agreement will receive a timely, up-or-down vote in Congress.
TPA Extension Provisions in the Trade Act of 2002 and Related
Developments
Under the 2002 Act as amended,2 Congress approved TPA for trade agreements
entered into before July 1, 2005, but also approved an automatic two-year extension of
TPA to cover trade agreements entered into before July 1, 2007, as long as two conditions
are met.  First, the President must request the two-year extension by April 1, 2005.
Together with the request, the President must submit: (1) a description of all major trade
agreements that have been negotiated and might be considered under TPA, and the
anticipated schedule for submitting those agreements for congressional approval; (2) a
description of progress in negotiations to achieve the purposes and objectives that
Congress approved in the title, and a statement that this progress justifies continuation of
negotiations; and (3) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed to complete
the negotiations.  In effect, these provisions require the President to justify how he has
used TPA thus far and how he might use it over the next two years.
On March 30, 2005, the President submitted a report of approximately 260 pages that
contains the request for TPA extension.3  The report provides an overview of the
Administration’s trade policy and relates that trade policy to trade agreements concluded
under TPA and to trade negotiations in progress.  Lengthy appendices include detailed
descriptions of free-trade agreements (FTAs) that have been concluded under TPA
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provisions and of FTAs now under negotiation4, as well as a comprehensive summary of
each concluded FTA and how each FTA made progress in achieving the TPA objectives.
A second condition for the two-year extension of TPA is that neither House of
Congress adopt an extension disapproval resolution before July 1, 2005.  The 2002 Trade
Act includes the exact language for such a disapproval resolution.  It states that an
extension disapproval resolution may be introduced in either House of the Congress by
any Member of that House, and a disapproval resolution must be referred in the House of
Representatives to the Committees on Ways and Means and on Rules.  Although there is
no provision on committee referral in the Senate, the prescribed procedure appears to
presume a referral to the Committee on Finance, which has jurisdiction over trade matters
in the Senate.
Under the 2002 Trade Act, expedited procedures (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) would
apply to floor consideration of extension disapproval resolutions.  The act, however,
provides that it is not in order for: (1) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval
resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance; (2) the House of Representatives
to consider any extension disapproval resolution not reported by the Committees on Ways
and Means and on Rules; or (3) either House of the Congress to consider an extension
disapproval resolution after June 30, 2005.
Given these provisions, the committees could take a number of actions on a
disapproval resolution.  For example, a committee could vote to adopt a motion to report
a disapproval resolution favorably or unfavorably (see next section for committee action
on extension disapproval resolutions in 1991).  In such cases, the resolution could be
brought to the floor.  On the other hand, a committee could vote down a motion to report,
or simply not take up the resolution at all.  In these cases, a resolution would be stopped
in committee.
On April 6, 2005, Senator Dorgan introduced extension disapproval resolution
S.Res. 100.  In his submission statement, Senator Dorgan indicated he believed that the
Senate Finance Committee would not allow the resolution to go to the Senate floor.5 
Prior Vote on TPA Extension
A two-year extension of TPA, then called fast-track authority,  was considered only
once before.  Under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418),
Congress approved fast-track authority for trade agreements entered into before June 1,
1991, and provided for a two-year extension.  The provisions in the 1988 Act were almost
identical to those in the 2002 Act.  In 1988, the two-year extension was principally
intended to allow more time for the on-going multilateral trade negotiations (Uruguay
Round) in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  By the time then-President George H.
W. Bush requested the two-year extension, however, he had notified Congress of his
intent to negotiate a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  That agreement,
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not the WTO negotiations, became the center of the debate on the two-year extension.6
The debate was also influenced by the political situation at the time:  the President was
a Republican, and both Houses of Congress were controlled by the Democratic party.
The President requested the two-year extension on March 1, 1991.7  Disapproval
resolutions were introduced in the House (H.  Res. 101) on March 6, 1991, and in the
Senate (S.Res. 78) on March 13, 1991.  On March 7, 1991, the Chairmen of the Senate
Finance Committee and of the House Ways and Means Committee sent a letter to the
President saying that the President should address some concerns about environmental
standards, worker rights, and similar issues, before Congress voted on extension of fast-
track procedures.  The House Majority Leader sent a letter with similar intent on March
27, 1991.  On May 1, 1991, the President responded with an extensive action plan that
addressed the concerns raised.  On May 9, 1991, the House Majority Leader introduced
a resolution (H.Res. 146) that the President be accountable in meeting the action plan and
other objectives.
On May 23, 1991, the House defeated its disapproval resolution by a vote of 192-
231, but approved H.Res. 146 by a vote of 328-85.8  The next day, the Senate defeated its
disapproval resolution by a vote of 36-59.9  These actions indicated that, while Congress
did not want to prevent the two-year extension, it planned to closely monitor the
negotiations, particularly with respect to a NAFTA.
Implications for U.S. Trade Policy and Negotiations
To understand the implications of the current possibility of TPA renewal for U.S.
trade negotiations, it might be helpful to look at the reason why expedited procedures for
implementing bills were approved in the first place.  During multilateral negotiations in
the 1960s (the Kennedy Round), the Administration negotiated two non-tariff trade
agreements without explicit authority from Congress.  The prevailing view in Congress
was that the President had overstepped his delegated tariff-cutting power in negotiating
these non-tariff trade agreements, and Congress decided not to enact legislation to
implement those trade agreements.  This result showed that the two branches of
government would have to be more collaborative, if trade agreements in the future were
to be negotiated and brought before Congress with any likelihood of approval.  The
compromise reached in the 1974 Trade Act was that Congress would guarantee an up-or-
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down vote without amendment, as long as the President consulted with Congress and
followed its directives in the negotiations. 
A central question in considering extension of TPA is whether or not a trade policy
that promotes the negotiation and approval of trade agreements is in the national interest.
Supporters of trade agreements argue that the agreements offer opportunities for U.S.
exporters in markets that otherwise would be closed to them and provide consumers with
a wider selection of low-cost products.  They also state that trade agreements increase the
level of trade, which helps the national economy to grow.  Opponents of trade agreements
argue that the agreements are often biased toward the business community and do not give
enough consideration to other important objectives, such as saving workers’ jobs or
protecting the environment.  Some opponents believe that certain trade restrictions should
be left in place to protect domestic industries.
Another question is, if Congress decides that negotiation of trade agreements should
be part of U.S. trade policy, is TPA necessary for those negotiations?  Trade negotiators
generally view TPA and its assurance of an up-or-down congressional vote as important,
if not critical, for their credibility in trade negotiations.  They argue that many foreign
countries may not elect to negotiate with the United States if TPA is not in effect.  This
is because without TPA’s ban on amendments, Congress can alter an implementing bill
and thereby possibly change the nature of the agreement or the balance of concessions
achieved.  They argue that substantial changes might require renegotiation and might even
kill the agreement.  On the other hand, opponents of TPA are reluctant to give power to
the President to conclude a trade agreement that Congress cannot change.  They argue that
the ban on amendments under TPA is an abdication of the constitutional role of Congress
to regulate foreign commerce.  Some opponents also claim that the consultation
requirements of TPA have been ineffective, because the President has consulted in-depth
with only a small number of Members.
It is generally believed that the expedited procedures of TPA probably have the
greatest effect for negotiations involving a large number of countries.  The United States
is currently participating in multilateral talks in the Doha round of negotiations in the
World Trade Organization (WTO).  These talks, which began in 2001 and are probably
at least a year from conclusion, involve 148 WTO member countries.  Because of the
complexity of such talks, renegotiation of an agreement among 148 countries would be
tremendously difficult, so U.S. negotiators would see TPA’s ban on amendments as
crucial to maintaining the final balance of concessions in an agreement.  If TPA is
extended two years, the current negotiations would continue, and the new  deadline of
June 30, 2007 would effectively set the deadline for signing an agreement.  Without TPA,
negotiations could continue, but with no clear deadline and the possibility of amendments
in Congress, other countries might reconsider the scope and timing of further talks.
Much the same can be said of negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA).  Negotiations on an FTAA began in 1994, and 34 countries are participating.
Talks so far have been slow and difficult, and some might argue that, because of the
difficulty of these negotiations, TPA is important because any renegotiation would be
highly difficult.  On the other hand, others might argue that TPA does not matter much,
because it is unlikely that an FTAA can be reached by the June 30, 2007 deadline.
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For smaller regional or bilateral negotiations, the effect of TPA on any set of trade
negotiations might depend on how economically or politically controversial those
negotiations are.  The more controversial the talks, the greater the possibility that
substantial amendments might be offered and the greater the possible effect of whether
or not legislative constraints apply under TPA.  For example, NAFTA was highly
controversial, and it is likely that without the expedited procedures of fast-track authority
(TPA), an implementing bill would have been substantially amended.  In comparison, the
free-trade agreement with Jordan was negotiated without TPA, and the implementing bill
was changed little during congressional consideration.
Several smaller regional or bilateral trade agreements are now under negotiation, but
they will not be concluded in time to qualify for TPA without the two-year extension.
Most, if not all, might be concluded in time to qualify for TPA with the two-year
extension.  How important might the TPA expedited procedures be, if the Administration
concludes agreements and submits implementing bills to Congress?  It is difficult to say.
Agreements under negotiation include free-trade agreements (FTAs) with Thailand,
Panama, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, countries in the Andean region, and
countries in southern Africa.  Negotiations probably will continue with or without TPA.
With TPA, implementing bills would be considered under expedited procedures without
amendment; without TPA, bills would be considered under normal legislative procedures
and would be amendable.  Some of the negotiations have controversial aspects, such as
claims that worker standards are not adequate, or arguments that U.S. apparel makers and
U.S. sugar producers will face damaging competition from foreign producers.  Some
negotiations are also controversial, because they might have political rather than
economic rationales.  A two-year extension of TPA probably would be more important
for some of these on-going negotiations than for others.
If TPA is extended for two years, new negotiations might be considered.  For
example, the Administration might propose FTA talks with additional countries in the
Middle East, as part of the Administration’s proposal for a Middle East Free Trade Area.
If TPA is not extended, the Administration probably would be more restrained in pursuing
new trade negotiations, or might pursue less controversial negotiations. 
Finally, the issue of a two-year extension of TPA will have no effect on trade
agreements that are already signed.  These agreements, which Congress might consider
this year, are an FTA with five Central American countries and the Dominican Republic
and an FTA with Bahrain.  They qualify for expedited procedures already.
